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ABSTRACT 
 
The Riegle-Neal Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 eliminated previous restrictions 
on interstate banking and branching in the U.S. banking industry.  It was expected that this 
deregulation would accelerate the consolidation already underway among U.S. banks.  Previous 
research examined the initial impact of Riegle-Neal on the number of banking institutions and 
branches by analyzing data from immediately before the act was passed in 1994 to immediately 
after it became fully effective in 1997.  That research found an increase in the rate of 
consolidation among U.S. banks, with an increase in the number of mergers, an increase in the 
number of newly chartered banks, a decrease in the number of bank failures, and an increase in 
the number of new bank branches.  This paper considers whether these immediate effects of 
Riegle-Neal have persisted into the longer term or have moderated in the years since the act 
became fully effective.  The analysis of data since 1998 presented here indicates that the initial 
effects of the act have moderated.  The rate at which the number of banking institutions is 
decreasing has slowed.  The rate of merger and acquisition activity has decreased.  Bank failures 
are very low.  There has been a slow down in the increase of new bank branches.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
he McFadden Act of 1927 and other legislation restricted the ability of U.S. banks to engage in 
interstate banking and branching.  The Riegle-Neal Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 
removed these restrictions by allowing banks to request regulatory approval for mergers across state 
lines.  Section 44, a) 1) stated that beginning on June 1, 1997 interstate mergers could be approved.  Section 44, a) 3) 
indicated that such mergers could be approved before June 1, 1997 if the home states of each bank involved in the 
merger approved interstate banking merger transactions with all out of state banks.  This was expected to accelerate 
the trend toward consolidation which was already taking place in the U.S. banking industry. 
 
In previous research Matasar and Heiney (2002) studied the immediate effects of the deregulation instituted 
by Riegle Neal.  They examined the effects of the act on consolidation in the U.S. banking industry in terms of the 
number of banking institutions, merger and acquisition activity, the number of de novo banks, the number of bank 
failures, and the number of bank branches.  In addition, they studied the impact on bank profitability, the availability 
of service and the level of fees, and employment and compensation in the industry. 
 
Since Riegle-Neal was passed in 1994 and became fully effective in 1997, Matasar and Heiney examined 
data from 1990 to 1998 to capture the initial impact of the act by looking at the period from before the act was 
passed to immediately after the act became fully effective.  They indicated that: 
 
This study of Riegle-Neal may appear somewhat premature or preliminary because of the short period of time since 
the law was enacted and fully enforceable.  Nonetheless the findings herein reveal the direction that changes 
associated with the law are likely to take and thus serve as a base-line for future analysis. 
 
The snowball of change in the banking community continues to roll and pick up speed even as this book is being 
written.  What is being presented here, therefore, is a still photo of a moment in time, as well as comparison with the 
T 
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past.  The future of banking and of financial services in the 21
st
 century is likely to differ considerably from what it 
was at the end of the 20
th
 century.  Hopefully this book offers a foundation for further thought and understanding of 
the future now being considered.  (Matasar and Heiney, 2002, p. viii.) 
 
This paper examines the consolidation in the U.S. banking industry which has taken place since Rielge-
Neal became fully effective.  It presents information on that consolidation in terms of the number of banking 
institutions, the number of bank branches, merger and acquisition activity, bank failures, and de novo banks. 
 
THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF CONSOLIDATION IN THE BANKING INDUSTRY 
 
When Riegle-Neal eliminated the restrictions on interstate banking and branching activity, it was expected 
that newly available merger and acquisition opportunities  across state lines would accelerate the consolidation 
among U.S. banks already underway.  There were concerns regarding the resulting impact on the level of bank 
services and fees and on employment in the industry.  Rose (1997) presents a thorough examination of the possible 
consequences of the increased consolidation resulting from increased interstate banking. 
 
One reason to expect increased merger activity was the opportunity to take advantage of economies of 
scale.  A merger can be a less costly way to achieve efficient asset size than internal expansion.  Calem (1994) 
indicates that there are economies of scale in the banking industry up to an asset size of $75 million.  Economies of 
scale seem to run out for banks with assets between $75 and $300 million.  Beyond $300 million in assets, 
diseconomies of scale seem to set in.   
 
Merger activity may also be a mechanism to replace inefficient management.  Calomiris and Karceski 
(1998) ask, “Is the Bank Merger Wave of the 1990s Efficient?”  The economic analysis of government regulation 
often argues that regulation has the effect of protecting less efficient firms from competition by more efficient firms.  
Economides, Hubbard, and Palia (1996) present a political economy model in which it is argued that federal 
branching restrictions were designed to protect smaller, less efficient banks from larger, more efficient banks.  
Jayaratne and  Strahan (1998) also examine the relationship between entry restrictions and efficiency for commercial 
banks. 
 
It can also be argued that the interstate mergers newly allowed by Riegle-Neal provided an opportunity for 
banks to reduce risk through geographic diversification.  The extent to which geographic diversification reduces risk 
for an institution depends on the correlation of economic conditions in different areas of the country.  If economic 
conditions are very highly positively correlated across regions of the country, then geographic expansion through 
interstate banking and branching will not contribute significantly to the objective of risk reduction.  Carlino and Sill 
(2000) find that the correlation coefficients for real per capita personal income across the regions of the U.S. are 
typically above 0.88.  The far west region is an exception for which correlation coefficients with the other seven 
regions are between 0.20 and 0.32.  Sherwood-Cali (1990) examines the economic stability of different regions of 
the country in terms of state industry diversification.  She finds that the reduction of volatility due to industry 
diversification provides the opportunity of risk reduction through geographic expansion of financial institutions. 
 
Smoluk, Andrews, and Voyer (2003) provide a methodology for examining the “potential benefits of risk 
reduction for financial institutions wishing to grow primarily through a strategy of geographic expansion.” (p. 47)  
They find that “by strategically investing in different regions, a financial institution could reduce its potential 
earnings risk by over 58 percent while maintaining or improving potential profitability.” (p. 48) 
 
THE INITIAL IMPACT OF RIEGLE-NEAL: 1990 – 1998 
 
Between 1990 and 1998 the number of banking institutions in the U.S. decreased by 3,288 or 26.7% from 
12,303 to 9,015.  The change in the number of banking institutions is determined by the number of mergers and 
acquisitions, the number of bank failures, and the number of new banks formed.  This decrease in the number of 
banks was primarily due to merger and acquisition activity during this period.  From 1990 to 1998 there were 4,944 
banking mergers.  During this period there were only 70 bank failures.  Therefore, mergers and failures would have 
resulted in a decrease in the number of banks of 5,014.  The fact that the number of banking institutions decreased 
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by less than this amount is due to the 1,071 de novo banks which began operation in this period.  Furthermore, the 
effect of the decreasing number of institutions on the availability of service was ameliorated by an increase in the 
number of bank branches by 13,396 from 49,848 to 63,244.  (Matasar and Heiney, 2002) 
 
CONSOLIDATION IN THE U.S. BANKING INDUSTRY SINCE RIEGLE-NEAL: 1998 – 2003 
 
The Number of Banking Institutions 
 
Table 1 and Figure 1 present information on the number of banking institutions and changes in the number 
of institutions for Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) insured commercial banks in the 50 states and the 
District of Columbia.  These data are slightly different from those reported in Matasar and Heiney (2002) because 
they come from a different FDIC report, and the data reported above for 1990 to 1998 did not include the District of 
Columbia.  In Table 1 the number of banking institutions decreased from 12, 329 to 8,756 between 1990 and 1998.  
This decrease of 3,573 was a decrease of 28.98% over the 8 year period for an average of 3.62% per year.  Between 
1998 and 2003 the number of banking institutions decreased from 8,756 to 7,752.  This decrease of 1,004 was a 
decrease of 11.47% for the 5 year period, or an average of 2.29% per year.  It appears that the rate of consolidation 
has slowed since the initial impact of Riegle-Neal. 
 
Consider the percentage changes in the number of institutions before Riegle-Neal was passed in 1994, the 
period during which Riegle-Neal became effective from 1994 to 1998, and the period since Riegle-Neal became 
fully effective, i.e., after 1998.  From 1990 to 1994 the rate at which the number of institutions was decreasing 
increased from 2.9% to 4.69% per year.  Between 1994 and 1998 when Riegle-Neal began to have its initial impact 
the rate of decrease in the number of banks held at over 4.0% per year.  Since 1998 the rate of decrease in the 
number of institutions has decreased steadily from 4.03% to 1.5% for 2003. 
 
Mergers and Acquisitions 
 
Table 2 provides additional information concerning the breakdown of the changes in the number of 
institutions due to new banks, mergers, and failures.  From 1994 to 1997, the period from when Riegle-Neal was 
passed to when it became fully effective, the number of unassisted mergers increased from 547 to 599.  Since 
Riegle-Neal became fully effective in 1997 the number of unassisted mergers has decreased from 599 to 276 in 
2002.  The number of mergers has decreased for each of these years except the year 2000.  It appears that merger 
activity increased during the period in which Riegle-Neal became effective and has decreased since that time. 
 
Newly Chartered Banks 
 
The data on newly chartered banks in Table 2 indicates that new charters had been decreasing during the 
period prior to the passage or Riegle-Neal.  From 1990 to 1994 the number of new charters decreased from 165 to 
49 per year.  After the passage of Riegle-Neal, the number of new charters increased each year from 49 in 1994 to 
231 in 1999.  Since 1999 the number of new charters has decreased each year to only 91 in 2002.  It is clear that the 
period during which Riegle-Neal became effective was one in which the number of institutions was decreasing but 
the number of newly chartered banks was increasing at the same time. 
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Table 1:  Number of Institutions 
Year Number of Institutions Change % Change 
 Institutions Number of Institutions Number of Institutions 
2003 7752 -118 -1.5 
2002 7870 -192 -2.38 
2001 8062 -235 -2.83 
2000 8297 -266 -3.11 
1999 8563 -193 -2.22 
1998 8756 -368 -4.03 
1997 9124 -386 -4.06 
1996 9510 -411 -4.14 
1995 9921 -510 -4.89 
1994 10431 -513 -4.69 
1993 10944 -505 -4.41 
1992 11449 -460 -3.86 
1991 11909 -420 -3.41 
1990 12329 -368 -2.9 
1989 12697 -422 -3.22 
1988 13119 -586 -4.28 
1987 13705 -488 -3.44 
1986 14193 -209 -1.45 
1985 14402 -81 -0.56 
1984 14483 29 0.2 
1983 14454 19 0.13 
1982 14435 34 0.24 
1981 14401 -20 -0.14 
1980 14421 70 0.49 
1979 14351 27 -0.19 
FDIC, Historical Statistics on Banking 
 
Table 2:  New Charters, Mergers, and Failures 
Year New Unassisted Failures
Charters Mergers Mergers Paid Off
2002 91 276 6 4
2001 129 360 3 0
2000 192 456 6 0
1999 231 421 6 0
1998 194 563 3 0
1997 188 599 1 0
1996 145 553 5 0
1995 101 609 6 0
1994 49 547 11 0
1993 61 480 35 27
1992 72 428 72 25
1991 105 446 85 20
1990 165 393 141 17
1989 192 411 175 31
1988 229 598 173 36
1987 219 543 136 50
1986 255 341 101 40
1985 330 336 87 29
1984 391 330 61 16
1983 361 314 32 12
1982 315 256 24 7
1981 198 210 5 2
1980 205 126 7 3
1979 203 223 7 3
1978 149 165 4 1  
FDIC, Historical Statistics on Banking 
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Figure 1:  Number of Institutions 
 
 
Bank Failures 
 
Table 2 indicates that bank failures have not played a major role in the change in the consolidation trend in 
the U.S. banking industry during these periods of time.  From 1990 to 1994 the number of bank failures assisted by 
mergers decreased consistently from 141 to 11.  During that same period the number of paid off failures increased 
from 17 to 27.  These numbers of failures, however, were consistently lower than the number of failures in the mid 
to late 1980s.  After the passage of Riegle-Neal in 1994, the number of paid off failures was zero until there were 4 
in 2002, and the number of failures assisted by mergers decreased to single digits.  
 
Branches 
 
Table 3 and Figure 2 present information on the number of bank branches and changes in the number of 
branches.  Again, compare the period during which Riegle-Neal became effective and the period since then.  
Between 1990 and 1998 the number of branches increased from 50,017 to 61,394.  This was an increase of 11,377 
or 22.75% over the 8 year period.  This is an average of 2.84% per year.  From 1998 to 2003 the number of branches 
increased by 5,372 from 61,394 to 66,766.  This is an increase of 8.75% for the 5 year period for an average of 
1.75% per year.  It appears that the rate at which branches are increasing has slowed since Riegle-Neal.   
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Prior to Riegle-Neal the rate at which branches were increasing decreased from 4.97% in 1990 to 1.79% in 
1993, with an actual decrease in the number of branches in 1992.  In 1994 the number of branches increased by 
4.17%, and between 1994 and 1998 the percentage change in the number of branches fluctuated between 2.2% and 
4.39% with no particular pattern.  Since 1999 when the number of branches increased by 2.78% the pattern has 
again fluctuated down to 1.8% for 2003. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has extended previous research which studied the initial impact of the Riegle-Neal Act on 
consolidation in the U.S. banking industry by examining the period of time since this deregulation became fully 
effective to see if the immediate effects set in motion by the passage of the act have continued or moderated. 
 
The data on the number of banking institutions indicate that the number of institutions continues to 
decrease.  However, the rate at which the number of banks is decreasing has slowed since Riegle-Neal became fully 
effective.  Merger and acquisition activity, which increased during the period of time Riegle-Neal became effective, 
has also moderated since 1997.  Similarly, de novo banking activity, which increased between 1994 and 1999, has 
decreased in more recent years.  Finally, the rate of increase of bank branches has decreased since Riegle-Neal.   
 
 
Table 3:  Number of Branches 
Year Number of Branches Change % Change 
  Number of Branches Number of Branches 
1984 41485   
1985 42970 1485 3.58 
1986 44054 1084 2.52 
1987 45017 963 2.19 
1988 46036 1019 2.26 
1989 47650 1614 3.51 
1990 50017 2367 4.97 
1991 51591 1574 3.15 
1992 51544 -47 -0.09 
1993 52467 923 1.79 
1994 54656 2189 4.17 
1995 56028 1372 2.51 
1996 57258 1230 2.2 
1997 59773 2515 4.39 
1998 61394 1621 2.71 
1999 63101 1707 2.78 
2000 63487 386 0.61 
2001 64965 1478 2.33 
2002 65584 619 0.95 
2003 66766 1182 1.8 
 
FDIC, Historical Statistics on Banking 
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Figure 2:  Number of Branches 
 
 
AUTHOR INFORMATION 
 
Joseph N. Heiney received his Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Chicago.  He is currently Professor of 
Economics at Elmhurst College in Elmhurst, Illinois.  Previously he served as the Director of the Center for 
Business and Economics and Coleman Foundation Distinguished Chair at Elmhurst College.  His recent research 
has been concerned with the continuing consolidation in the U.S. banking industry and its effects on asset size 
distribution, profitability, employment, and compensation.  Email:  josephh@elmhurst.edu 
 
REFERENCES 
 
1. Calem, Paul S.  “The Impact of Geographic Deregulation on Small Banks,” Business Review, (Federal 
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia), (November - December, 1994), pp. 17 - 31. 
2. Calomiris, Charles W. and Jason Karceski.  Is the Bank Merger Wave of the 1990’s Efficient?  Washington, 
D.C.:  The AEI Press, 1998. 
3. Carlino, Gerald A. and Keith Sill.  "Regional Income Fluctuations: Common Trends and Common Cycles,"  
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Working Paper No. 00-8, August, 2000.   
4. Economides, Nicholas, R. Glen Hubbard, and Darius Palia.  “The Political Economy of Branching 
Restrictions and Deposit Insurance:  A Model of Monopolistic Competition among Small and Large 
Banks,” The Journal of Law and Economics, XXXIX N. 2 (October, 1996), pp. 667-704. 
5. FDIC, Statistics on Banking, Historical Statistics on Banking, FDIC web site. 
6. Jayaratne, Jith and Philip E. Strahan.  “Entry Restrictions, Industry Evolution, and Dynamic Efficiency:  
Evidence From Commercial Banking.”  Journal of Law and Economics, XLI (April, 1998), pp. 239 - 273. 
7. Matasar, Ann B. and Joseph N. Heiney.  The Impact of Geographic Deregulation on the American Banking 
Industry.  Westport, Conn.: Quorum Books, 2002. 
8. Rose, Peter.  Banking Across State Lines:  Public and Private Consequences.  Westport, Conn.:  Quorum 
Books, 1997. 
 
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
70000
80000
19841985198619871988198919901991199219931994199519961997199819992003200020012002
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
B
ra
n
c
h
e
s
Year
Series1
Journal of Business & Economics Research – September 2011 Volume 9, Number 9 
78 © 2011 The Clute Institute 
9. Sherwood-Call, Carolyn.  "Assessing Regional Economic Stability: A Portfolio Approach,"  Economic 
Review, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Winter, 1990, pp. 17-26. 
10. Smoluk, H. J., Bruce Andrews, and John Voyer.  "A Methodology for Analyzing the Effects of Geographic 
Diversification for Financial Institutions," American Business Review, XXI N. 1 (January, 2003), pp. 47-55. 
 
 
